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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8225
INFO USCINCO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 01402

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, VE

SUBJECT: CALDERA CAMP VIEWS THE COUP ATTEMPT

AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOURTEEN SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL CALDERA, HOSTED A FEBRUARY 8 LUNCHEON FOR POLCOUNS AND POLOFF TO "IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EMBASSY" AND EXCHANGE VIEWS.

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
PAGE 02 CARACA 01402 01 OF 02 102104Z UNSURPRISINGLY, THE CONVERSATION CENTERED ON THE RECENT COUP ATTEMPT. CALDERA SUPPORTERS BELIEVE (AND SOME SMALL OPINION POLLS AGREE) THAT CALDERA'S NATIONAL STANDING HAS BEEN GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE COUP ATTEMPT AND BY HIS RESPONSE, WHICH HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR RECTIFICATION OF CORRUPTION AND FOR CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY. END SUMMARY.

LUNCH WITH CALDERISTAS

3. FOURTEEN SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL CALDERA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J OLSON CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2006 200503206

UNCLASSIFIED



COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS.

THE FEBRUARY 4 COUP ATTEMPT

4. ONE PARTICIPANT CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN A LIST, PURPORTING TO SHOW TOP JOBS UNDER THE POST-COUP "COUNCIL OF THE NATION". THIS COUNCIL WAS TO HAVE INCLUDED MILITARY OFFICERS AS MINISTERS OF GOVERNMENT AND OF THE PRESIDENCY, PLUS EIGHT FUNCTIONAL AREAS. AT THE TOP WAS SIMPLY "SR. (BLANK), PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA; HE TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT THE TOP JOB WAS TO BE OFFERED TO A CIVILIAN. SOME CALDERISTAS BELIEVED THAT "ZETA" AND "EL CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 CARACA 01402 01 OF 02 102104Z NUEVO PAIS" PUBLISHER RAFAEL POLEO WAS THIS CIVILIAN. THEY CITED HIS DAUGHTER PATRICIA'S "HASTY" DEPARTURE FROM CARACAS ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 2, AS ONE PIECE OF EVIDENCE IN THIS REGARD. PATRICIA POLEO ALLEGEDLY CALLED AROUND TOWN THE MORNING OF HER DEPARTURE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BORROW OTHERS AT THE GATHERING SPECULATED THAT "FISCAL" DOLLARS. (ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OMBUDSMAN) RAMON ESCOVAR SALOM COULD HAVE BEEN THE CIVILIAN PRESIDENT. POLCOUNS ASKED IF HE WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED; SEVERAL PERSONS LAUGHED THAT ESCOVAR WANTS THE JOB OF PRESIDENT SO BADLY, HE WOULD TAKE IT FROM ANYONE'S HANDS. THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE ALLEGEDLY TO HAVE BEEN, INTER ALIA, FORMER MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DIM) CHIEF HERMINIO FUENMAYOR AND FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE ADMIRAL HECTOR JURADO TORO. (COMMENT: DESPITE THE CLAIM OF HAVING SEEN THE LIST, THESE RUMORS ARE NOT VERY CREDIBLE.)

5. ANOTHER CALDERISTA AT THE LUNCH CLAIMED TO KNOW, FROM A COLONEL WHO WAS PRESENT WITH OCHOA, THAT WHEN COUP LEADER LT. COL. CHAVEZ FRIAS AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OCHOA ANTICH TALKED BY TELEPHONE DURING THE COUP ATTEMPT, CHAVEZ FRIAS SUPPOSEDLY OFFERED THE MINISTER LEADERSHIP OF THE COUP EFFORT. OCHOA ANTICH IN REPLY SUPPOSEDLY DISCLAIMED ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP ATTEMPT, AND SIMPLY

PLEDGED TO GUARANTEE CHAVEZ' PERSONAL SECURITY IF HE AGREED TO SURRENDER. THE CALDERISTAS CONCLUDED THEIR DISCUSSION OF CHAVEZ WITH THE JUDGMENT THAT, IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS AFTER THE COUP, CHAVEZ FRIAS HAD BECOME THE MOST POPULAR PERSON IN VENEZUELA, "A VENEZUELAN RAMBO."

CALDERA

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NEEDLESS TO SAY, THESE CALDERISTAS ALL EXPRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT ONLY THEIR MAN CAN ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE COUNTRY'S MANY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE COUP ATTEMPT AND ITS AFTERMATH, PARTICULARLY CALDERA'S FEBRUARY 4 INTERVENTION IN CONGRESS, GREATLY ENHANCED HIS PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS. THEY BELIEVE THAT HE IS NOW THE SECOND MOST POPULAR PERSON IN VENEZUELA, BEHIND COUP LEADER CHAVEZ FRIAS. MAINTAIN THAT CALDERA DELIBERATELY CHOSE TO "BREAK THE CONSENSUS" IN HIS CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION TO PROVIDE A SORT OF NATIONAL CATHARSIS BY "TELLING THE TRUTH" ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRY. THEY CITE POLL RESULTS FROM THE SATURDAY PRESS (BASICALLY, MAN-IN-THE-STREET POLLS OF ABOUT 200 PERSONS EACH), WHICH SHOWED CALDERA FAR AHEAD OF ALL OTHER POLITICIANS IN PUBLIC OPINION. THEY

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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-15 AID-01 AMAD-01 A-01 CA-02 CCO-00

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HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00
M-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-06	OMB-01	OPR-01	PA-01
PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03	SNP-01	SP-01	SR-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 CARACAS 01402

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, VE

SUBJECT: CALDERA CAMP VIEWS THE COUP ATTEMPT
DEFINED THE PRIORITIES OF A CALDERA PRESIDENCY AS GOOD
(COMPETENT) GOVERNMENT, HONESTY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUP

7. THE CALDERISTAS SAW THE COUP ATTEMPT AS A "MESSAGE" TO THE GOVERNMENT TO INSTITUTE BASIC CHANGES OR RISK OVERTHROW. POLCOUNS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORM PACKAGE WAS OF DIRECT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 CARACA 01402 02 OF 02 102104Z
COUP OR POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD IT: SURELY, CORRUPTION
AND GOVERNMENTAL INCOMPETENCE WERE MORE IMPORTANT FACTORS
IN POPULAR DISCONTENT, AND EVEN IN THE DISCONTENT OF THE
MILITARY. WHILE NOT DENYING THAT POLLS INDICATE THIS IS
SO, THE CALDERISTAS REPLIED THAT IT IS POVERTY AND HARD
ECONOMIC TIMES THAT MAKE THE PEOPLE CARE SO MUCH ABOUT
CORRUPTION AND BAD GOVERNMENT. IF PEOPLE HAD GOOD JOBS AT
GOOD PAY, THEY WOULD RETURN TO THEIR TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE
OF TOLERANCE.

8. WHEN ASKED HOW THE ECONOMY COULD BE TURNED AROUND AS QUICKLY AS THEY SEEMED TO THINK WAS NEEDED, THE CALDERISTAS WERE LONG ON GENERALITIES AND SHORT ON SPECIFICS. THEY REPEATED THAT THE POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE BECOME TOTALLY ALIENATED FROM THE PEOPLE AND PURSUE ONLY THEIR OWN INTERESTS. ONLY CALDERA, BY THEIR ANALYSIS, IS ABOVE THE GENERAL DECLINE. THEIR POSITION APPEARED TO

BOIL DOWN TO THIS: THAT WITH CALDERA RUNNING THINGS, NOT ONLY WOULD POLICIES CHANGE IN UNSPECIFIED WAYS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCY RISE, BUT THE PEOPLE (BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT) WOULD BE WILLING TO WAIT AND WOULD NOT EXPECT MIRACLES.

9. SEVERAL OLDER MEN MENTIONED WITH CONCERN THE EXPERIENCE OF JANUARY 1958 -- E.G., THERE WAS AN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST DICTATOR PEREZ JIMENEZ (WHO HAD, MANY STILL CLAIM, SUBSTANTIAL POPULARITY), FOLLOWED THREE WEEKS LATER BY THE SUCCESSFUL COUP THAT FORCED HIM INTO EXILE AND INAUGURATED VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY. THE CALDERISTAS STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT A REPLAY IS THE LAST THING THEY WANT, SINCE THEY SEE THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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MAN AS THE PROBABLE NEXT PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA IF PEREZ
SERVES OUT HIS TIME AND ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE AS EXPECTED
IN DECEMBER 1993.
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